Sunday, 23 October 2011

The Semarang Environmental Agenda: a stimulus to targeted capacity building among the stakeholders

Habitat International 24 (2000) 443-453

Tjahjono Rahardjo

Centre for Urban Studies, Soegijapranata Catholic University, Semarang, Indonesia

Abstract

Recently, a sustainable development action plan was prepared for the city of Semarang, Indonesia. An essential component of this action plan was the building up of an effective partnership among the diverse stakeholders to ensure their commitment. Such an approach in which the city's stakeholders are actively involved in decision making was new for Semarang. This paper describes the roles and attitudes of the different stakeholders in the development of the action plan, and the complex and difficult process to forge partnerships between them. The paper explores the constraints faced during this participatory process, and suggests that there is a need to build the capacity of all stakeholders involved * local government, civil society and the private sector * so that they will be able to play their envisaged respective roles better.

Keywords: Local government; Partnerships; Sustainable development; Capacity building; Local agenda 21; Indonesia

1. Introduction

The 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro called on local governments to prepare their own sustainable development action plans in consultation and partnership with their respective communities. Semarang was one of the first Indonesian cities to prepare such a plan. The preparation of the plan was designed to involve all relevant stakeholders. This was an unusual approach in Indonesia at that time, and valuable lessons were learned from the process.

It was, for example, discovered that there is a need for capacity building measures at the local level, aimed to help the various stakeholders to play their roles more effectively. Besides acquiring new skills, it was felt that changes in their attitudes were required, in particular those of local government officials. This paper attempts to identify the capacity building initiatives needed to respond to the demand for a more responsive, effective and efficient urban management practice.

The first part of this paper briefly describes the city of Semarang and the main problems it faces, which is followed by an account of the preparation of the Action Plan entitled the Semarang Environmental Agenda. The next part focuses on the capacity building initiatives needed to improve the quality of stakeholder involvement in Semarang. The concluding part summarises the lessons learned during the process. The constraints and shortcomings which were encountered are listed, as well as the prospects of the new opportunities that might now be feasible given the democratisation process currently taking place in Indonesia.

2. Semarang: growth, environmental degradation and poverty

Located on the low northern coastal plain of Java, Semarang is inhabited by 1.4 million people (1998), making it Indonesia's fifth most populous city. The population is expected to reach nearly 1.7 million in 2008. Besides the rapid growth of its population, in the last three decades Semarang has also experienced constant economic growth. However, this often has been at the expense of the existing ecosystems and community systems.

Indiscriminate development of housing estates on the hills surrounding the city, for example, has resulted in serious monsoon flooding in low-lying areas. Excessive coastal land reclamation has caused tidewater inundation in areas near the coast, including the historic old town. Overexploitation of the groundwater for industrial, commercial and residential purposes has caused acute land subsidence in many parts of the city as well as seawater intrusion reaching up to several kilometres inland.

The benefits of Semarang's economic development have not been equitably distributed either. The unprecedented economic growth has created a small privileged group of &new rich', while the gap between poor and rich has widened. Even worse, government interventions, supposedly to alleviate poverty, have often undermined existing traditional social networks, the very ties which, in the current economic crisis, proved to be crucial elements of the coping strategy of the poor (Jellinek and Rustanto, 1999). According to official figures 3% of Semarang's population lives in absolute poverty. Unofficial sources give somewhat higher figures. Some have calculated that around 10% of the population are living in absolute poverty, with an additional 15% being `near poor’. Thus, the total percentage of those living in poverty may have been as high as 25%, and this was before the economic crisis. The crisis has added a substantial number of `new poor’ to the already large number of urban poor. One source has calculated that about 50 - 60% of the population is now poor.

3. The Semarang environmental agenda

Officially, the initiator of Semarang's environmental agenda is the local Environmental Impact Management Agency (better known by its Indonesian acronym: Bapedalda), but in reality it was the World Bank through the Metropolitan Environmental Improvement Project (MEIP) that first suggested the idea. MEIP had been trying to sell the idea of preparing a sustainable development action plan for Semarang to different local government agencies but the only one showing any interest was Bapedalda.

The Bank suggested that Bapedalda work together with a local university to form a Joint Team. The Centre for Urban Studies*Soegijapranata Catholic University, which already had had some experiences working with Bapedalda, was subsequently selected. The task of the joint Bapedalda-Soegijapranata team would be mainly to set up the process of stakeholder involvement.

Bapedalda was rather apprehensive about using the title `Semarang Local Agenda 21a. It feared that other local government agencies might think that Bapedalda was trying to meddle in their a!airs. It was decided that the title `Semarang Environmental Agendaa would generate fewer objections, as the word `environmentala would justify Bapedalda taking the lead.[1]

Referring to the Agenda 21 Indonesia, the Semarang Development Guideline, and the Semarang Five-year Development Plan, the Joint Team prepared a rough, tentative list of environmental issues in Semarang. This draft &Environmental Agenda' was distributed to organisations and institutions seen to represent the various stakeholders. It should be noted that they were more or less arbitrarily selected.[2]

All relevant local government agencies were selected to participate, and so were the universities in Semarang, the business community and various non-governmental organisations. The business community consists of the Chamber of Commerce, the local chapter of the Real Estate Indonesia (the association of Indonesian real estate developers) and two major manufacturing companies.

Non-governmental organisations were selected on the basis of their "eld of activities,[3] which, in practice meant all those being involved in environmental issues and related fields. Various youth, student, women and professional groups (including the Semarang Legal Aid Foundation, the Consumers Group and the Journalist Association) were included in this category. The involvement of community-based organisations was restricted to those having `city widea activities.[4] Those that covered only limited areas, such as neighbourhood associations (rukun tetangga)[5], were not included, as their sheer number made it impractical to do so. In total, 66 organisations, 22 of which were local government agencies and the rest representing the business community and civil society, were invited to take part in the process to develop the Semarang Environmental Agenda.

All stakeholders were then requested to present their reactions to the draft ‘Environmental Agenda'. The Joint Team felt that it would be better to organise two separate meetings to do this.

The first one was for local government agencies, the second for the private sector and the community. The reason for this was that it would allow the local government agencies to first agree among themselves (or to use a favourite expression among Indonesian bureaucrats: `to arrive at a common perceptions’) before meeting the other actors. Non-governmental stakeholder representatives were invited for the second meeting.

It is interesting to note the distinctly different tones of the two meetings. The firrst meeting mainly focused on issues like establishing tasks and responsibilities: which agency is or should be responsible for a certain affair. Also, statistical figures such as the number of poor people, the volume of uncollected garbage, the extent of flooding, etc. were commented upon and discussed at great length. Each agency had its own, sometimes conflicting, figures.

Participants of the second meeting, while expressing their appreciation for being invited to participate,[6] were not interested in such details. Their main concern was with the implementation of the agenda once it was formulated. They strongly questioned the local government's commitment because all too often they had witnessed the government breaking its own promises. The two meetings made it clear that in Semarang at that time, (i) there was no real trust yet between the stakeholders, (ii) the role of the local government was very dominant, and that (iii) the concept of sustainable development was not as yet widely understood.

The Joint Team integrated the inputs gained from these two meetings into a report. The plan was to have more meetings with the two groups of stakeholders followed by a joint plenary discussion.

At the end of this process a stakeholder dialogue forum was to be set up. In the mean time, the MEIP was consulted and asked to comment on the draft report. The MEIP felt that the report was too formal and too academic, and, consequently, not very interesting. The agency was of the opinion that it would not serve the purpose of raising the awareness of and stimulating continued dialogue between the stakeholders. Bapedalda's head, on the other hand, wanted to have something tangible to show to the mayor, a document of some kind, and not just a report on a vague conceptual process. She was rather impatient with the series of meetings and consultations, and suggested that the consultation sessions be skipped except for the plenary session. As a compromise, it was finally agreed that separate consultations with the stakeholders would be organized after the plenary session.

4. The local government of Semarang and its partners

Local governments in Indonesia, following current trends, are trying to move from the role of `providers to that of `enablers. Semarang is no exception as its local government is now expected to create an enabling environment for other actors. As enablers, the local government should facilitate the efforts of and to build on the potentials of other actors by `setting up and jointly managing partnerships, but without having overall controls (Bailey, Barber & MacDonald, 1995).

According to Holmes and Krishna (1996): “By engaging a wide range of stakeholders, the pool of resources available to support decision-making is enlarged, ownership is generated, capacity and learning are enhanced and the quality of performance is enhanced.”

To be able to act as an enabler, local governments according to Yap and Mohit (1998) should at least be able to:

  • Understand and assess the existing conditions;
  • Identify the urban actors locally involved and to understand their interests and motives;
  • Develop policies in consultation with all stakeholders;
  • Identify partners and determine what each partner can do;
  • Negotiate and mediate partnerships to address the problems, and
  • Monitor the process and evaluate the impact.

If these yardsticks are applied to the preparation of the Semarang Environmental Agenda, Semarang has not fared very well.

To understand and assess the existing conditions, for example, accurate, up to date information is needed. But in Semarang there was a serious scarcity of reliable data and information. It is true that most of the needed information was ultimately collected, but it proved very cumbersome to gather it from different sources. Besides, its accuracy was often questionable. Data on the same subject but coming from different sources often gave different, and sometimes even contradicting figures.

Above all, it was found that forging partnerships with other stakeholders was definitely not one of the strong points of Semarang's local government. From the beginning, it had difficulties to identify its partners, to understand their motives and interests, not to mention to determine what each partner can do and to jointly develop relevant policies. Instead of trying to adopt a participatory attitude necessary to establishing partnerships, local government staff often assumed a paternalistic attitude towards other urban actors. Apart from that, a supportive legal, institutional and financial framework was clearly missing.

Mutual trust amongst the parties involved is the most essential foundation for partnerships. Before any real dialogue can take place the parties will have to be able to overcome feelings of suspicion and to treat each other as equals. During the preparation of the Agenda, however, this element of trust, understanding and respect among the stakeholders was conspicuously missing.

To support efforts to build trust and to engage the participation of the stakeholders, there should be a flow of information. In this respect the role of the local government in preparing information and to disseminate this to the widest possible audience is very important. This information should be interesting, imaginative and easy to understand. But as was mentioned earlier, initially there was criticism on the way the first draft of the Agenda was presented. It was just like any other official document: formal, dull and often obscure, not exactly something that the public would easily understand.

For the general public it was also difficult to convey their views to the government as there was no e!ective forum for this purpose. Of course the government of Indonesia has always encouraged its citizens to `participate’ in development. This, however, is interpreted as the people participating in programmes initiated by government in a top-down way. The people are expected to at least give their consent; and, even better, to donate their time, labour and money. Seldom, if ever, are they invited to share their ideas and knowledge. This so-called `participation’ is not based on the concept of co-operation, of partnership, but rather on the concept of mobilisation of people's resources.

This top-down approach has been practised in all aspects of life in Indonesia. Because of the government's very powerful position, civil society is usually left out of the planning and decision making process of development programmes.

This is also true for the Integrated Urban Infrastructure Development Programme (IUIDP), which has been hailed as an innovative urban management approach in Indonesia. One of the reasons for this claim is that the programme has changed the government's approach in urban infrastructure planning and programming from a sectoral and top}down one to a more integrated bottom-up approach. However, the term `bottom-up’ here is misleading as it does not mean real involvement and participation of ordinary citizens at the grass-roots; it only means more local government administrative responsibilities (vis-à-vis the central and provincial governments). The preparation of the Medium-term Investment Plan,[7] the main planning tool of IUIDP, hardly involves the community. This plan is prepared by local governments, and is appraised by provincial and central government agencies.[8]

In view of the key role of the local government in the process of drafting the Environmental Agenda, considerable attention has been given to its role. However, this does not mean that the roles of other urban actors in Semarang are not worth discussing. First, let us briefly consider the private sector. One thing to note here is that some private sector enterprises can afford to be less efficient and cost-effective as they are involved in informal deals, make use of informal contacts and engaged in corrupt practices. Corruption is widespread in Indonesia, and companies try to build rent-seeking `partnerships’ with influential and well-connected elements of the local government.

This misinterpretation of the meaning of partnership has caused distortions in Semarang's development as environmental, social and legal costs are often externalised causing the worsening of environmental degradation and social disparity in the city.

The weakest group of stakeholders in Semarang are those loosely grouped under the heading civil society. Their weak bargaining position has not helped them in negotiations with other stakeholders. Their position is further negatively affected by the fact that there is no real democratic representation. Members of the handpicked city council do not have real constituents and are only accountable to their respective parties (which in reality are only government sponsored ersatz parties). Meanwhile, there is no channel for the rukun tetanggas or neighbourhood associations to be involved in decision making processes at the city level; besides, their interests tend to be limited to neighbourhood wide issues.[9]

The new laws on local autonomy and revenue sharing will enable local authorities to draw up their own pay scales, instead of following the uniform one now effective nation wide. Some natural-resource-rich regions are already trying to attract professionals in central government organisations with offers of attractive salaries.

5. The present and future needs for capacity building in the context of the Semarang environmental agenda

The preparation of the Semarang Environmental Agenda has brought out several weak points as regards the roles, attitudes and modes of operation of all stakeholders involved in the process, but particularly on the part of the key player: the local government. A distinction can be made in this respect between more intangible issues such as a lack of trust and credibility on the one hand, and a more concrete lack of capacities and skills which are required to successfully bring a participatory planning process to a good end. However, it is argued that these issues are linked in many ways: a bureaucracy will only be credible and be trusted as a partner if it is characterised by integrity as well as capability.

Let us first consider the issue of trust and credibility. It was shown that there was a lack of trust among the stakeholders, stemming from the local government's low credibility. One sign of this was sharp rivalry among local government agencies, clearly demonstrated during the preparation of the Semarang Agenda. Government credibility is also undermined by the lack of creativity and the tendency of bureaucrats to avoid responsibility by passing on decision making to higher levels in the hierarchy. Given the lack of confidence in the government on the one hand, and the pivotal role it plays on the other hand, the main priority for capacity building relates to rebuilding the credibility of the local governments. Attention should be given to the creation of a strong organisational culture, good management practices, and effective communication networks, in addition to improving rules and regulations or procedures and pay scales, as Peltenburg, Davidson, Teerlink and Wakely (1996) point out. Of course, it would be too much to expect that the building of a strong organisational culture and shared norms and values would eliminate rivalry altogether, but it can help (various agencies of) local government to develop a common vision based on which it can perform a common mission.

Building up the credibility of the local government would also require improving the quality of its employees. It is widely acknowledged that the number of civil servants in Indonesia, which includes local government personnel, is too large. The government had previously adopted a `zero-growtha policy, and later even a `minus-growtha policy for its civil servants, and has stopped recruiting new personnel. It has not yet gone as far as to lay o! redundant staff, but retired personnel are replaced only in very special cases.

A leaner (and more efficient) workforce would make higher salaries possible. The very low pay of civil servants is often used as an excuse for the rampant corruption in Indonesia, giving it the dubious reputation as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Higher salaries will attract better qualified person to work in local government agencies.[10] Meanwhile, for the remaining staff, there is a need for re-training to improve their quality. From the perspective of staff members, another attraction would be a merit-based career prospective; this should replace present payment and promotion practices based on seniority or on personal connections. These measures to enhance the quality of staff will be important in the future when new people can be again appointed.

In sum, what is urgently needed now is a strategy to develop the capacity of the local government in all three dimensions: human resource development, organisational development and developing and adjusting the institutional and legal framework of local governments. This will enhance local government capacity in general, and the capacity to stimulate and facilitate stakeholders' participation in specific. It will also help local governments to change their attitudes. To paraphrase John F. C. Turner, their attitude should be a willingness to work with the people, instead of for the people, and certainly not for their own vested interests. New skills such as information and communication skills, including the use of modern media like the Internet, will be useful in building awareness and stimulating further participation of stakeholders. To support this it is necessary is to establish an accurate database on the various aspects of urban development, easily accessible to all relevant parties.

But it is not only local governments where more capacity and changed attitudes are required. The private sector needs to understand the importance of being able to compete fairly and openly. The patronage of government officials should not be relied upon anymore. Private companies will have to be able to compete not just with local, but also (in this era of globalisation) with international and multinational competitors.

And finally, turning to civil society, it is imperative that support is given to strengthen its bargaining position. This can be done by giving support to (i) help raise awareness and confidence amongst NGOs and local level and community organisations (ii) show what opportunities are available and (iii) build a network of similar, likeminded organisations which can speak with one voice. Local government can certainly play a role here in terms of providing relevant information and technical and management assistance. But for the time being it may be more realistic to rely on organisations such as the Legal Aid Foundation, the Consumers Group, and other advocacy groups, non-governmental organisations and universities. Capacity building for the people, however, should not be merely focused on their perceived weakness but should also, or perhaps in the first place, address the need to reinforce their existing strength (Aede, 1997).

To summarise, there are clear and urgent capacity building requirements relating both to the local government, the private sector and civil society. The question is whether and how the authorities will respond to these requirements. Before considering the prospects for this, recent political developments in Indonesia are briefly reviewed; developments which have a direct bearing also on the issue of local administrative and political change.

6. A changing context: political change in Indonesia

The preparation of the Semarang Environmental Agenda coincided with a period of fundamental changes in Indonesia. The preparation process started in early 1997; the full impact of the Asian economic crisis had yet to hit Indonesia. President Suharto, who had been in power for three decades, was still in full control of the country. By the end of 1997 Indonesia's economy was in ruins and the value of its currency, the rupiah, fell to a record low. In May 1998 Suharto was forced to resign and in June 1999 a fair and free election was conducted for the first time since 1955.

These changes offer vast opportunities, but the challenges are also overwhelming. The multidimensional crisis has forced the Indonesian people to look back and do some soul searching to try to find out what had gone wrong. Many ideas have been thrown around to solve Indonesia's woes. They have touched on issues that used to be taboo, such as amending the constitution, restricting the role of the military and having a federal instead of a unitary state. There is no doubt that these changes will affect the way Indonesian cities, including Semarang, are managed. For example, as a result of the elections, the city of Semarang, like other local entities in Indonesia, will have a democratically elected city council and mayor. Being more legitimate, they will theoretically be more credible. The introduction of new laws that give local governments extensive political responsibility and fiscal authority[11] will make them even stronger.

The citizens, however, have also become more outspoken in their demand for a local government that can deliver services, deliver them equitably, quickly and inexpensively, and without the people having to pay bribes. The cry for `reformasi’ (reforms), following the severe economic crisis and the even more serious political and social crises, have made the people more aware of their rights. Like people elsewhere in Indonesia, people in Semarang want much more say in a!airs influencing their life. And as part of the political reform, the people have been demanding for a more transparent, responsive and accountable government at all levels.

Despite all that, however, the management of the city will continue to depend on the old bureaucracy for some time to come; a bureaucracy that, besides showing little ability to develop partnerships with other urban actors, is also notoriously corrupt. The local government, its agencies and its staff are ill prepared to deal with the challenges posed by new situation. Though there have been some half-hearted attempts at reforms, the bureaucracy basically still clings to its old ineficient, heavy-handed ways. Its attitude of `business as usual’, acting as if oblivious to the fact that Indonesia is facing a terrible crisis, arguably the worst in its history, has been widely criticised.

This has been the reason why the civil society continues to distrust the local government. Even international donor agencies - though not saying it openly - seem to share this view. The implementation of social safety net programmes for people hardest hit by the crisis brought this out very clearly. The donors practically by-passed local government agencies and went directly to non-governmental and community based organisations instead.

Therefore, with reformasi there is an even more pressing need for the local government to change, if it is to regain its credibility. The process of preparing the Environmental Agenda showed, however, that it is not very likely that the local government will change from within under its own initiative. It needs urging (from powerful bodies such as the World Bank for example); and it also needs critical inputs from partners such as non-governmental organisations, universities and other civil society organisations.

The new city council as a democratically elected legislative body will of course play a central role in controlling the local government. But at the moment there are many people who worry about the quality of the city's new legislators. A majority of them are from newly formed parties. In addition to their lack of experiences, their education level is also generally low. Their counterparts in the local government have much more experience and are better educated. Therefore, without strengthening the capacity of Semarang's City Council, it may not be realistic to expect it to become an e!ective guardian of the people's interests.

7. Conclusion[12]

For the urban stakeholders at the local level in Indonesia to be able to e!ectively respond to the challenges and new opportunities, they will have to develop new attitudes, internalise new knowledge and information and acquire new skills. Hence, there is a clear need for capacity building. But is the supply side ready to meet this demand? Is there enough political will to implement change, to adjust organisations and the institutional context? Are national and local training institutions ready; what can international training institution do; what are the actual options?

In Indonesia, there are some promising developments in the area of human resource development. Many local government staff have realised that there is a need to improve their capacity and have, on their own initiatives, enrolled in various training programmes.[13] There are indications that the national government is starting to realise that there is a need to change the attitude of the bureaucracy. It has, for example introduced changes in the way skills up-grading courses are conducted for civil servants who are to be promoted. In the past, these regional and national level courses tended to be indoctrinative in nature. Indeed, they were deliberately designed to assure loyalty of civil servants to the (old) regime. Quite recently the concept of entrepreneurial government a` la Osborne and Gaebler (1992) has been introduced in these courses, which is undoubtedly related to the change in the political environment. Yet these are only superficial changes which need to be followed up by more fundamental changes. Whether these will take place very much depends on the outcome of still unpredictable political developments.

The current changes in the political situation in Indonesian will hopefully lead to a truly democratic society in which there are partnerships between and mechanisms of `checks and balances' among the urban actors. Otherwise, Semarang and other cities in the country will continue to face the problems similar to those described in this paper, problems which threaten their sustainability: a widening gap between poor and rich and continued environmental degradation.

Solving these problems is constrained by a serious lack of trust amongst the city's stakeholders, a lack of confidence in the local government, widespread corruption and the weak position of civil society organisations in relation to other actors.

The establishment of a credible government will help bring about urgently needed policy changes in the areas of human resource development, organisational development and in institutional and legal frameworks. Only with improved governance is there a chance for more attention for capacity building for improved governance, which can respond to the urgent capacity building requirements identified in this paper. And only then there is hope that Semarang and other Indonesian cities will not have to face far more serious social, economical and ecological problems then they are now already facing.

References

Aede, D. (1997). Capacity Building: An Approach to People-Centred Development. Oxford: Oxfam.

Bailey, N., Barber, A., & MacDonald, K. (1995). Partnership Agencies in British Urban Policy. Toronto: UCL Press.

Holmes, M., & Krishna, A. (1996). Public sector management and participation: institutional support for sustainable development. In: Rietsberger-McCraker, J. (Ed.), Participation in Practice: The Experience of the World Bank and Other Stakeholders World Bank Discussion Paper no. 333. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Jellinek, L., & Rustanto, B. (1999). Survival Strategies of the Javanese during the Economic Crisis. Unpublished Preliminary Report.

Osborne, D., & Gaebler, T. (1992). Reinventing Government. Reading: Addison-Wesley, MA.

Peltenburg, M., Davidson, F., Teerlink, H., & Wakely, P. (1996). Building Capacity for Better Cities. Rotterdam: IHS.

Yap, K. S., & Mohit, R. S. (1998). Reinventing Local Government for Sustainable Cities in Asia: Implementing the Habitat II agenda in education and training. Regional Development Dialogue, 19(1), 87}94.

Further reading

Anonymous (1979). Semarang: Masa Lalu, Masa Sekarang dan Masa Mendatang. Pemerintah Kotamadya Daerah Tingkat II Semarang, Semarang.

Anonymous (1997). Agenda 21 Indonesia*Strategi Nasional untuk Pembangunan Berkelanjutan. Kantor Menteri Negara Lingkungan Hidup, Jakarta.

Anonymous (1998). Agenda Lingkungan Semarang: Menuju kota yang berkelanjutan 1998}2003. Pemerintah Kotamadya Daerah Tingkat II Semarang dan Lembaga Penelitian Universitas Katolik Soegijapranata, Semarang.

International Council for Local Environmental Initiative (1996). The Local Agenda 21 Planning Guide: An Introduction to Sustainable Development Planning. ICLEI, IDRC, UNEP, Toronto.

Jellinek, L. (1991). The Wheels of Fortune. Sydney: Allen and Unwin,

Lanti, A., & van der Hoff, R. (1997). 'The Integrated Urban Infrastructure Development Programme (IUIDP) in Indonesia'. In K. Singh, et al., Integrated Urban Infrastructure Development in Asia. New Delhi and Oxford: IBH Publishing.

Project INS/90/026 Formulation of Provincial Shelter Strategies to Strengthen the National Shelter Strategy of Indonesia (1993). Recommended Provincial Shelter Strategies for Central Java. UNDP and the Ministry of Housing, Jakarta.



[1] The Badan Pengendali Dampak Lingkungan Daerah (Bapedalda) is a local government agency responsible for environmental related issues. Its head reports directly to the mayor. However, within the local government there is also an environmental division (Bagian Lingkungan Hidup) whose responsibilities often overlap Bapedalda's.

[2] The local government played a dominant role in the selection of stakeholder representatives. For instance, only those non-governmental organisations not too critical to the government were invited. The three government-sanctioned parties were not invited, as they had no real political influence and were set up merely as proof that Indonesia was a democracy.

[3] At first Bapedalda was not comfortable with the idea of involving non-government institutions in the preparation of the Agenda, but eventually it was convinced of the potential benefits of this approach.

[4] Only one CBO actually fulfilled this criterion. In Semarang there is no real city-wide community-based organisation. What was here considered as such was an association of community-based housing groups that actually only represented a small number of people scattered all over the city.

[5] The rukun tetangga is found in every community in Indonesia. Its voluntary leadership is elected directly by heads of households in the particular neighbourhood, making it one of the more democratic institutions in Indonesia under the New Order regime. It is, though, still male biased, as heads of households tend to be male. It was originally set up by the Japanese occupation government during World War II to mobilise and control the populace; it was revived in 1969 to stimulate community development. Each RT consists of about 30 households.

[6] A number of them acknowledged that this was the first time they were invited to take part in a discussion on policy issues by the local government. Originally, it was feared that the Bapedalda would suggest that the government controlled local legislative body represent the stakeholders.

[7] Program Jangka Menengah (PJM) in Indonesian

[8] In practice, as they lack the required capacity, local governments appoint consultants to do the job. This often gives

[9] The new law on local government has tried to address this issue by stipulating that at the village (rural and urban) level there will be a directly elected legislative body. In the old system the lowest legislative body is at the city level that was in reality a mere rubber stamp body.

[10] The new laws on local autonomy and revenue sharing will enable local authorities to draw up their own pay scales, instead of following the uniform one now e!ective nation wide. Some natural-resource-rich regions are already trying to attract professionals in central government organisations with o!ers of attractive salaries.

[11] Two new national laws have recently been passed. Thefirst one will give wider decision making power to the local government, while at the same time making them more accountable to their constituents. The local legislative body, which in the past was considered part of the local government, is now seen as a separate entity. The second law will give local governments considerably more revenue sharing power.

[12] I am indebted to Cor Dijkgraaf of IHS for the insights he gave me for this section. However, the views expressed are entirely my own

[13] There have been many cases, however, when these people become disappointed after returning to their regular working environment. The high hopes they had to be able to do something worthwhile with their newly acquired knowledge are often not in line with the rigid bureaucratic system.

Friday, 21 October 2011

Forced eviction, homelessness and the right to housing in Indonesia

Paper presented to the International Conference on Homelessness, New Delhi 9-13 January 2006

Tjahjono Rahardjo

Post Graduate Programme on Environment and Urban Studies

Soegijapranata Catholic University

Abstract

To promote economic growth and attract investments while maintaining political stability Indonesia’s repressive New Order regime suppressed the rights of workers. Strikes were outlawed and anyone who questioned the government’s policy was dealt with severely.

The same approach was also applied in the management of cities. Many people had to give up their land and homes, often without any (or with very little) compensation, when the authorities declared that these were needed for “development” purposes, which in practice, however, meant that they were going to be used for more economically profitable purposes. As in the case of labour, any resistance was seen as disturbing the public order and were not tolerated. As a result many people were rendered literary homeless.

The fall of Suharto following the devastating financial crisis in 1997 brought about fundamental changes in Indonesian. On the one hand Indonesia was able to hold a truly democratic election, the first in 44 years; its press has enjoyed a much greater freedom then those in most countries in the region. On the other hand, however, Indonesia has not been able to curb the rampant corruption that has given it the dubious reputation of one of the most corrupt countries in the world.

This paper would like to see what influences the current changes have had on the housing situation of the poor. Furthermore, it would like to argue that the poor housing condition in Indonesia, is not only caused by poverty, as in many countries, but, more seriously, by the disregard of the people’s right to housing.

Keywords: Indonesia, forced eviction, right to housing, homelessness

FORCED EVICTION: PAST AND PRESENT

The basic policy of General Suharto’s New Order government was to promote economic growth while maintaining political stability. Under this policy the rights of workers were suppressed for the sake of attracting investments, many of which were closely connected to the ruling elite. Strikes were outlawed and anyone who questioned this policy was dealt with severely (Budiman, 1993).

The same approach was also applied in the management of cities. Many people had to give up their land and homes, in most cases without any (or with very little) compensation, when the authorities declared that these lands were needed for “development” purposes, which in practice, however, meant that they were going to be used for more economically profitable purposes. As in the case of labour, any resistance was seen as disturbing the public order and were not tolerated. As a result many people were rendered literary homeless.

Following the Asian economic crisis, in which Indonesia was the worst hit, Suharto was forced to step down in May 1998 after only serving one month in his seventh term as president. In 1999 Indonesia embarked on its tortuous road towards becoming a democracy and carried out it first truly democratic parliamentary election in 44 years. In October 2004 Indonesia held the first direct presidential election in its history, which put Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in office.

Although since the demise of Suharto’s repressive regime Indonesia is supposed to be on its way towards becoming a democracy, forced evictions have not stopped and in fact still occur on a massive scale[1]. In 2003 the Centre on Housing Rights and Eviction (COHRE) picked out Indonesia, followed by Guatemala and Serbia & Montenegro, as being the country with the highest forced eviction incidence (COHRE, 2003). COHRE has estimated that in Jakarta, where most of the displacements in Indonesia have taken place, between 2000 and 2005 more than 92 thousand people have been forcefully evicted from their homes, while another 1.5 million people are in constant danger of being evicted. In addition about 23,000 becak (pedicab) drivers and 62,000 sidewalk vendors have been banned and displaced from their respective work places.

The Report of the International Fact Finding Mission on State Violence against the Poor in Jakarta[2] informs that between January and October 2001 some 5,785 houses in Jakarta were demolished, making more than 23,000 people homeless. In October 2001 alone 2,470 families lost their homes due to forced eviction, (premeditated) arson or a combination of both (Anonymous, 2001). Because of their supposedly illegal status no compensations were given to the victims. Ironically, despite its record in human right violation, i.e. the right to adequate housing, the city of Jakarta received the UN Habitat Scroll of Honour of 2005, a decision that has been questioned and even challenged by many people and organisations.

Such cases are not just found in Jakarta. In Semarang, for example, residents in the village of Karanganyar in Ngaliyan sub-district were evicted in from their land in 1976. They had held the land for generations under customary law. Corrupt officials who were in the pay of a private housing developer tricked them to surrender their land. The developer, however, failed to build any houses and eventually was declared bankrupt. In 2002 some of the people tried to move back and build their houses on the land[3]. Within a month unidentified thugs demolished the houses, while the police who were present only looked. Later, however, the police detained and questioned some of the victims and accused them of illegal occupation (Septiviant, 2003).

The Urban Poor Consortium (UPC) (2005) has calculated that between 2000 and 2005 in Indonesian cities a total of 95,470 people, or about 19,000 households, have been evicted from their homes and rendered homeless. This figure does not include those who became homeless as a result of arm conflicts (such as the hostilities in Aceh and Papua), and natural disasters (such as the devastating tsunami that hit the northern part of Sumatra in December 2004).

In January 2005, less than a month after the tsunami disaster in northern Sumatra, the Indonesia Infrastructure Summit was held in Jakarta. Delegates representing nineteen different countries as well as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank as well as the Indonesian government and private sector attended the meeting. At the end of the summit the Declaration of Action on Developing Infrastructure and Public Private Partnership was signed by the representatives of the respective delegates.

At the summit the Indonesian government made it known that it needed investments to improve and develop its infrastructure amounting to a total of IDR 1,305,000,000,000,000[4]. To begin with, the Indonesian government invited investments for 91 projects having a total value of IDR 205,500,000,000,000. In return the Indonesian government promised to issue 14 new regulations to meet the needs of the investors.

One of the new regulations passed is the Peraturan Presiden (President Regulation) 36/2005 on land acquisition. The issuance of this regulation was immediately followed by widespread criticisms and protests. This regulation is seen as repressive and totalitarian as it makes it possible for the government to arbitrarily and forcefully expropriate land, now in the name of “public interest” instead of for the sake of “development” (www.walhi.or.id/kampanye/psda/050728_perprerstnh_kp/). It is seen as very much favouring large private investors at the expense of the people.

The new regulation, which is seen by many as being even harsher than an earlier regulation that it replaced that was enacted by the Suharto regime, states that compensations will be decided through negotiations mediated by a committee set up by the government. It states further, however, that if within 90 days no agreement has been reached the committee can arbitrarily set the amount of compensation.

Most of those against the new regulation see that the negotiation process itself is inherently unfair, as the committee’s status as a body formed by the government would naturally raise questions about its impartiality; it is suspected that it would be inclined to act more in the government’s interest instead of the people’s. With a government bureaucracy that is notoriously corrupt (Rahardjo, 2000) this would, in turn, mean that the interests of large, financially powerful private investors would prevail[5]. Meanwhile, the right of the other parties in the negotiations to be accompanied by a lawyer is not even clearly stated in the regulation (Gofar, 2005).

According to Chalid Muhammad, executive director of the Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (WALHI), a leading Indonesian NGO as quoted in Kompas Daily (10 June 2005), the regulation will in effect legalise forced eviction; It would have the potentials of causing wide spread human rights abuse as it will make it much more easier for the government to forcefully evict people from their lands and homes. Even without the President Regulation eviction is already widely practiced in Indonesia; the new regulation will give the government an even stronger basis for continuing such practices (Gofar, 2005) and many more people would be made homeless.

HOMELESSNESS IN INDONESIA

The Report on strategies to combat homelessness (UNCHS, 2000) classifies the following

circumstances as being in the category of homelessness:

  1. Rough sleepers
  2. Pavement dwellers
  3. Occupants of shelters
  4. Occupants of institutions
  5. Occupants of unserviced housing
  6. Occupants of poorly constructed and insecure housing (vulnerable sites, precarious tenancy)
  7. Sharers
  8. Occupants of housing of unsuitable cost
  9. Occupants of mobile homes
  10. Occupants of refugee and other emergency camps
  11. Itinerant groups (nomads, gypsies)

The report, however, acknowledges that not all of these categories would be regarded as homelessness in all parts of the world. Though Indonesia, for example, does not yet have any official definition for homelessness[6], the national census of 2000 has categorised people into two groups: those having a permanent place to stay (mempunyai tempat tinggal tetap) and those not having a permanent place to stay (tidak mempunyai tempat tinggal tetap). Included in the second category are residents of so-called illegal settlements (permukiman liar) as well as nomadic communities and boat crewmembers[7].

Following the census grouping, only rough sleepers (category 1), pavement dwellers (category 2), occupants of insecure housing (in the sense of precarious tenancy) (category 6), occupants of refugee and emergency camps (category 10), and itinerant groups (category 11) of the above list would be regarded as being homeless in the Indonesian context.

For the purpose of this paper homeless people would be defined as adults (in contrast to street children) who are living permanently on the street, and those living in settlements categorised as “illegal”. This would include residents living in permukiman liar as well as the more obviously homeless tunawisma (rough sleepers as well as pavement dwellers). Occupants of refugees and emergency camps do exist in Indonesia as a result of the various natural disasters and political and ethnic conflicts that have broken out in the country. However, because they are a very special case and their problems much too complex compared to other categories of homelessness they would not be discussed here.

While the street homeless live under bridges, in the shade of large trees, or in abandoned buildings, permukiman liars are located on riverbanks, along drainage canals, along railway tracks and in station yards, and near market places. The residents of permukiman liar settlements build their dwellings out of used non-durable material such as cardboard, plastic sheets, pieces of wood and scrap metal. In some cases, however, one can find some dwellings that have been reasonably up-graded.

The majority of people who actually live on the street, those who live under bridges, in the shade of large trees or under overhangs of buildings more or less share the same characteristics of those living in permukiman liar. Their dwellings might be less permanent, but they work in the same informal occupations such as rubbish collectors, itinerant vendors, becak (pedicab) drivers, construction workers and other unskilled occupation, although some street homeless do make their livings by begging.

Both squatters and street homeless people are often subject to raids. The more violent evictions usually happen to squatters because usually it involves the sensitive issue of land ownership. The occupants usually refuse to be removed on the ground that they have been living there long before the land had any commercial value.

The more peaceful raids towards street homeless people are carried out because they are thought to be creating a nuisance or - using an expression often used by city officials and planners - ‘disturb the attractiveness of the city’. The street homeless, unlike the squatters, usually do not resist. They see their displacement as temporary (such as when there is a visiting dignitary or a national day celebration). After things have returned to ‘normal’ they are usually allowed to come back again to their old places. For the residents of permukiman liar, however, it is impossible to return because their settlements have been taken over by other users.

THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE HOUSING

The right to adequate housing is recognised in a number of international legal instruments. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), for example states that:

“Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing, and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control” (UDHR, article 25(1)).

The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Right (ICESCR) (1966), requires States to respect, protect and fulfil the contents of the following article:

“The States parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The State Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international co-cooperation based on free consent” (ICESCR, article 11(1)).

Other international human right instruments which enshrine and protect housing rights include the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1959), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965), the International Convention on All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979), The Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990).

The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has identified certain aspects that must be taken into account to determine housing adequacy. They include (a) legal security of tenure, (b) availability of services, materials, facilities and infrastructure, (c) affordability, (d) habitability, (e) accessibility, (f) location, and (g) cultural adequacy.[8]

In Indonesia, Act 4/ 1992 on Housing and Settlement acknowledges the right of all citizens ‘to live in and/ or to have the use of and/ or to own an adequate house located in a healthy, safe, harmonious and orderly environment’. Furthermore, the Act defines adequate housing as ‘a house structure that, at least, meets building safety, minimum floor area and health requirements.’ A healthy, safe, harmonious and orderly environment is defined as an environment that ‘meets spatial planning, land-use, ownership and service provision requirements’. Thus, according to the Act there are basically two aspects of housing adequacy: physical and legal. This is a rather limited definition of housing adequacy compared to that spelled out in the CESCR General Comment No.4. Perhaps this is because the Indonesian government still sees housing only as a basic need, albeit a strategic one, and not yet as a human right. Housing is considered as a strategic basic need, because it is seen as an entry point for the fulfilment of other basic needs (Republik Indonesia, 1994).

In September 2005 Indonesia ratified the ICESCR. However, it stated is reservation towards article 1 on self-determination. In addition, Indonesia does not recognise the complaint mechanism outlined in articles 20 to 25 of the covenant. Therefore, there are no possibilities for individuals and private groups to lodge complaints to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights against violations of economical, social and cultural rights in Indonesia. Thus, many see this as an indication of Indonesia’s a half-hearted ratification of the covenant.

HOUSING, THE KARTU TANDA PENDUDUK (KTP) AND EXLUSION OF THE POOR

All Indonesians above the age of seventeen should possess an identity card called the Kartu Tanda Penduduk (KTP) issued by their respective local authority. According to Yayasan Humana (2001) “A KTP is the sole defining element for both inclusion and identity”. Not having a KTP means that one is not officially registered as a citizen of ones city. Furthermore, it is a serious offence for which a person can to go to prison and be expelled from the city.

At a more private level, even to obtain a marriage certificate, for example, one needs to be in possession of a KTP. Those who do not have a KTP cannot legally marry and get a marriage certificate. Consequently, their children are not issued birth certificates, which will be a problem when they are about to enter school.

From a human rights point of view all kinds of national ID cards are problematic (Fussell, 2001). Not surprisingly, proposals to introduce national ID cards in the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia and other countries have raised debates on issues of government control and individual privacy[9].

The Indonesian KTP has its share of controversies. The better known one is the indication of religion as one of the item on the back of the card. There are only five religious categories: Islam, Katolik (Christian-Catholic), Protestan (Christian-Protestant), Hindu and Budha (Buddhist). As no other categories are possible this in effect discriminates other religious groups and those not having any religion[10]. Other forms of discrimination include the fact that until 1996 former members of the outlawed Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) had the letters “ET” for ex- tahanan politik (ex-political prisoner) stamped on their cards and that up to 1998 the category non-pribumi (non-native) as opposed to pribumi (native) appeared on KTPs held by Chinese Indonesians.

In October 2005 the Indonesian government stopped subsidising fuel. The subsidies on fuel have been seen as posing a too heavy burden to the state budget and, therefore, the government decided to end it. This has caused the costs of fuel (petrol, diesel fuel, kerosene) to rise by 87.5 percent to 187.5 percent. To assist poor families in coping with the rise of living costs the government devised the so-called bantuan tunai langsung (literary meaning“direct cash assistance”) scheme in the form of cash money amounting to IDR 100,000 per family/ month. This “well targeted subsidy” – to use a well known World Bank terminology - is seen as being more fair and effective in helping the poor compared to the indiscriminate fuel subsidies, which is seen as benefiting both the rich as well as the poor.

The registration of poor families and the distribution of the financial assistance, however, have not proceeded smoothly. There have been many complaints of people who are relatively well off receiving the assistance while the really poor, including those who are unemployed, ill or aged, have been passed over[11]. In any case, however, only those having KTPs are registered. Those who do not have KTPs – many of them residents of permukiman liars (illegal settlements) or tunawismas living under bridges, on sidewalks, in market places and in railway station yards - are automatically counted out.[12]

However, there is another, less obvious form of discrimination caused by the KTP system that is often overlooked: the inability of homeless people to access formal housing. To be able to obtain a KTP, which literary translates to ‘card indicating domicile’, on the one hand a person has to have an officially recognised address[13]. On the other hand, the homeless (whether they are squatters or tunawismas) do not have any official address. Therefore, they are not eligible for KTPs, are not registered as residents of the city where they live and do not appear in any official statistics. They are, in effect, caught in a vicious circle: having no officially recognised address they cannot obtain a KTP; having no KTP, they cannot gain access to formal housing (and, therefore, no formal address, which brings them back to square one).

They are also not organised into community and neighbourhood units (rukun warga and rukun tetangga)[14] in which every household (at least theoretically) should be a member of. Even if they are, their organisations do not enjoy official recognition. Thus, they are not able to gain access to urban services such as education, health care and, of course, housing, though the Indonesian government has launched many housing programmes for the urban poor such as the Kampung Improvement Project (KIP), the Community Based Housing Project and the Community Based Initiative for Local Development (CoBILD).

The Dutch colonial government under its Ethical Policy originally initiated kampung improvement. Called Kampong Verbetering in Dutch, it was implemented in the newly formed urban municipalities following the introduction of the Decentralisation Law at the beginning of the 20th century. The programme was triggered by the growing fear among the European population that the appalling health condition in the native settlements (kampungs) could pose a danger to their well being as well (Yodohusodo, 1991; Jellinek, 1995). It should be noted that, surprisingly, the colonial government never had any plans to remove those native settlements.

With the Japanese occupation and the ensuing struggle for independence this programme could not be continued, but in 1972 the Indonesian government with the support of the World Bank implemented its version of this programme in large and medium sized cities all over the country which was called the Kampung Improvement Project (KIP) [15]. This scheme, however, was only implemented in regular, legal settlements because there was a fear that improving illegal settlements could be seen as a de-facto recognition by the government.

The Community Based Housing initiative was introduced because the government realised that subsidised low-cost housing credit scheme has missed its intended target group and has instead benefited those who are economically better off. To support this initiative a special credit scheme was introduced. Instead of providing loans to individuals, this scheme, called the Triguna credit scheme, is aimed at community groups who otherwise (being informally employed individuals having no fixed incomes) would not be eligible for other types of housing loans.

The Community Based Housing initiative is based on a very simple concept. In practice, however, it was too complicated for the poor to handle. To apply for the Triguna loan which is manages by the government owned Bank Tabungan Negara (BTN), for instance, they had to prepare proposals. These proposals would have to include a large number of documents issued by different local government agencies as attachments. Besides being very time consuming, to obtain these documents more often than not entailed the paying of bribes; among the required documents were also copies of the KTPs of each community member.

Because of this complication, the Triguna scheme was only successful in a very small number of isolated places; it never became a viable and effective nationwide housing supply system for the urban poor as it was intended to be.

Recently, with the assistance of the UNDP the community-based housing concept was revived in twelve cities in Indonesia. But instead of depending on BTN’s Triguna loan as a source of finance, the Community Based Initiatives for Housing and Local Development (CoBILD) makes use of a Dutch government grant. The grant is managed as a revolving fund to be used to repair existing houses as well as to build new ones by a specially established independent financial institution accountable to the relevant stakeholders in each city.

Initially, CoBILD was planned as a long-term revolving programme. In its first phase it was planned that about 10,000 households in 100 kampungs in twelve cities all over Indonesia will benefit from the programme. Like previously mentioned housing schemes, only registered residents (in other words only those possessing KTPs) are eligible for CoBILD loans. Due to mismanagement and corruption, however, CoBILD has been successful in only two of the twelve cities: Semarang and Yogyakarta,[16] while in other cities it was discontinued after the first phase.

A LOOK AT THE FUTURE

The ratification of the ICESCR by the Indonesian government is an important move towards ensuring that the people’s economic, social and cultural rights are recognised. As a state that has ratified the ICESCR, Indonesia would have to adjust all its legal instruments to be in accordance with the content of the covenant. Indonesia, therefore, would be, among others, required to promote and protect the right to housing and prevent forced eviction from happening. Moreover, it would be obliged to report to the international community on the implementation of the ICESCR in Indonesia. However, as mentioned earlier, Indonesia has stated is reservation towards article 1 and does not recognise the complaint mechanism outlined in articles 20 to 25 of the covenant. This raises the question of the effectiveness of Indonesia’s ratification of the covenant in preventing forced eviction.

The KTP system in its present form can be (and has been) used to justify forced eviction. Persons without KTPs are not considered as being legal residents, thus removing them from their homes is not seen as a serious issue. The KTP system has, in many cases, been used to deny people their civil rights, including the right to housing. The KTP, therefore, should be reformed and should only be a citizen registration instrument, not the all-important document associated with ones domicile status.

It is perhaps too optimistic to hope that forced eviction will be something of the past, given the long history of forced eviction in Indonesia and the fact that corruption is so widespread. It is generally agreed that many of the problems faced by Indonesian cities are the results of the collusive interests of corrupt politicians, bureaucrats and rent seeking elements of the private sector. As long as systematic and structural corruption is still widely practised in Indonesia, there is little hope that forced evictions will cease.

On the contrary, recent developments - such as the issuance of the controversial Peraturan Presiden (Presidential Regulation) 36/2005 which has given forced eviction an even stronger legal basis – seem to point out that forced evictions will continue, probably at an even greater scale than what is taking place today. Together with the fact that Indonesia’s economy has not recovered from the 1997 crisis (which has forced a large number of people into poverty), those factors mentioned above can be seen as signs that we can expect more homeless Indonesians in the future.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I would like to thank my friend and colleague Benny D. Setianto for his help and support in the process of writing this paper. Besides supplying me with some important reference materials, he also shared with me his extensive knowledge of international law. I, however, take full responsibility for the contents of this paper.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Anonymous (2001) Report of the International Fact Finding Mission on State Violence against the Poor in Jakarta, November 4-8, 2001

Anonymous (2002) “Hak atas Perumahan yang Layak bagi Masyarakat Miskin di Kota” Suar, vol.3 no. 07 February 2002 pp. 3-5

Budiman, A., (1993) “Stabilitas Politik dan Pertumbuhan Ekonomi” in INFID (ed.) (1993) Pembangunan di Indonesia: Memandang dari Sisi Lain, Yayasan Obor Indonesia, Jakarta

Centre for Housing Rights and Eviction (COHRE) (2003) The COHRE Housing Rights Award 2003, http://www.cohre.org/waigo/presskit.doc (downloaded 11 August 2005)

Fussell, J. (2001) Group Classification on National ID Cards as a Factor in Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing. Paper presented to the Seminar Series of the Yale University Genocide Studies Program, November 15, 2001

Gofar, F.A. (2005) Perpres No 36 Tahun 2005: Melegalkan Penggusuran Paksa? in Kompas Daily 25 June 2005

Gómez, M. (2002) Measuring the Status of Housing Rights Across the World: Arguments for the Construction of a Global Indicator on Homelessness. Paper presented to the E-Conference on Homelessness in Developing Countries, CARDO, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, July 2002, http://www.campus.ncl.ac.uk/cardo/virtualconf/asp/ (downloaded 10 August 2005)

Jellinek, L. (1995) Seperti Roda Berputar: Perubahan Sosial Sebuah Kampung di Jakarta, Jakarta: LP3ES

Kasim, I. and J. da Masenus Arus (eds.) (2001) Hak Ekonomi, Sosial, Budaya: Esai-Esai Pilihan, Jakarta: ELSAM

Kompas Daily, 10 June 2005

Leach, M. (1998) A roof is not enough: A look at homelessness worldwide http://www.share-international.org/archives/homelessness/hl-mlaroof.htm (downloaded 30 July 2005)

Majlis Bahasa Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia (2000) http://dpb.gov.my/mab2000/Aktiviti/Pakar/s11perkot.pdf (downloaded May 2001)

Pandiangan, A. (2005) Memahami Posisi Kota Semarang Sebagai 4 Besar Kota Terkorup, in Seputar Semarang edition 79 year II, 1-7 March 2005

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Rahardjo, T. (2001) ESCOR Project R7905: The Nature, Extent and Eradication of Homelessness in Developing Countries: Indonesia, Semarang: Centre for Urban Studies, Soegijapranata Catholic University

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[1] One important difference, however, is perhaps the fact that today Indonesia’s much freer press (arguably one of the freest in the region) openly and regularly report eviction cases, whereas during Suharto’s time the tightly controlled press was forbidden to publish any news unfavourable towards the government.

[2] The mission, consisting of Won Soon Park (Executive Director, People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), South Korea), Jesse Robredo (Mayor, Naga City, the Philippines), Soetandyo Wignjosoebroto (Professor, Airlangga University Surabaya, and Member, National Commission on Human Rights, Indonesia), Saparinah Sadli (Chairperson, National Commission on Violence against Women, Indonesia) and Melly G. Tan (Member, National Commission on Violence against Women, Indonesia) took place between 4-8 November 2001.

[3] In the years since 1976 many of the evicted people have moved to other parts of the city (and even to other towns) to make a living because as farmers they do not have any land to cultivate and any place to stay. A few who refused to move had to rent houses in neighbouring villages near their former home.

[4] The exchange rate in October 2005 was about USD 1.- = IDR 10,000.-.

[5] In February 2005 Transparency International Indonesia published its report on corruption in Indonesia as perceived by the business community. The survey involved 1117 local and 118 foreign business people. The business people were asked to give their opinions of the performances of government agencies. Of the 21 cities surveyed the three most corrupt cities are Jakarta Surabaya and Medan. The survey concluded that corruption and bribery is not just a matter of supplementing low government salaries but has become a systematic part of the decision making process within local government agencies. Those who are not able to pay bribes, therefore, often become casualties of biased decisions made by these agencies (Pandiangan, 2005).

[6] It was only in 2000 that the Majlis Bahasa Brunei Darussalam - Indonesia -Malaysia (The Brunei Darussalam - Indonesia -Malaysia Language Council) adopted the term ‘ketunawismaan’ as the official translation of ‘homelessness’ to be used in the three countries. However, the Indonesian language does not make a distinction between ‘home’ and ‘house’, thus ‘ketunawismaan’ can also mean ‘houselessness.’

[7] The 2000 census showed that Indonesia had a population of 203.4 million people, 3.2 million of which did not have a permanent place to stay (tidak mempunyai tempat tinggal tetap).

[8] Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No.4 (1991) UN Doc. E/1992/23, Annex III.

[9] Even more serious then the issue of government control and protection of privacy are the role played by group classification on ID cards in the genocidical crimes conducted in such diverse places and times as Germany under the Nazis and Rwanda in 1994 (Fussell, 2001).

[10] Between 1979 and 1998 the category Konghucu (Confucianism) was removed, which is one form of discrimination towards the ethnic Chinese.

[11] Some of the undeserving benefit receivers are relatives and acquaintances of village administrators or, ironically, those who have enough money to bribe them.

[12] Jakarta’s Governor Sutiyoso, for example, justifies this policy by arguing that those without a Jakarta KTP are not residents of the city and are probably registered in other places. Therefore, to avoid duplications they are automatically not listed, even though they might be very poor.

[13] The State Minister of Popular Housing Decision No. 06/KPTS/1994 aptly sums this up in the following statement: “…… without a home or a permanent place to stay it would be difficult for a person’s formal existence to be recognised (to have a KTP) ……” (“......tanpa rumah atau tempat bermukim yang tetap keberadaan seseorang secara formal sulit diakui (memiliki KTP)……”).

[14] These organisations are a legacy of the Japanese occupation (1942-1945) when they were used to organise the people in war efforts (Jellinek, 1995). In 1969 Ali Sadikin, the governor of Jakarta, revived them to promote community participation in the city’s development. A rukun tetangga (RT) consist of around 30 households, while a rukun warga (RW) consist of around 10 RTs (300 households).

[15] The post-independence Kampung Improvement Project (KIP) is often referred by the World Bank as one of the more successful housing initiatives supported by the Bank.

[16] In view of Semarang’s success in implementing CoBILD, a Dutch NGO, the Stichting Garantiefonds Habitat Internationale (SGHI) has granted the CoBILD in Semarang additional funds to continue and extend the programme.

Thomas Karsten (1885-1945): “Indonesia bersatoelah, Indonesia bermoelialah."

Thomas Herman Karsten adalah tokoh yang berperan besar dalam perencanaan  kota  di  Indonesia . Ia memulai karirnya di  Indonesia  sebagai p...