Sunday, 23 October 2011

The Semarang Environmental Agenda: a stimulus to targeted capacity building among the stakeholders

Habitat International 24 (2000) 443-453

Tjahjono Rahardjo

Centre for Urban Studies, Soegijapranata Catholic University, Semarang, Indonesia

Abstract

Recently, a sustainable development action plan was prepared for the city of Semarang, Indonesia. An essential component of this action plan was the building up of an effective partnership among the diverse stakeholders to ensure their commitment. Such an approach in which the city's stakeholders are actively involved in decision making was new for Semarang. This paper describes the roles and attitudes of the different stakeholders in the development of the action plan, and the complex and difficult process to forge partnerships between them. The paper explores the constraints faced during this participatory process, and suggests that there is a need to build the capacity of all stakeholders involved * local government, civil society and the private sector * so that they will be able to play their envisaged respective roles better.

Keywords: Local government; Partnerships; Sustainable development; Capacity building; Local agenda 21; Indonesia

1. Introduction

The 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro called on local governments to prepare their own sustainable development action plans in consultation and partnership with their respective communities. Semarang was one of the first Indonesian cities to prepare such a plan. The preparation of the plan was designed to involve all relevant stakeholders. This was an unusual approach in Indonesia at that time, and valuable lessons were learned from the process.

It was, for example, discovered that there is a need for capacity building measures at the local level, aimed to help the various stakeholders to play their roles more effectively. Besides acquiring new skills, it was felt that changes in their attitudes were required, in particular those of local government officials. This paper attempts to identify the capacity building initiatives needed to respond to the demand for a more responsive, effective and efficient urban management practice.

The first part of this paper briefly describes the city of Semarang and the main problems it faces, which is followed by an account of the preparation of the Action Plan entitled the Semarang Environmental Agenda. The next part focuses on the capacity building initiatives needed to improve the quality of stakeholder involvement in Semarang. The concluding part summarises the lessons learned during the process. The constraints and shortcomings which were encountered are listed, as well as the prospects of the new opportunities that might now be feasible given the democratisation process currently taking place in Indonesia.

2. Semarang: growth, environmental degradation and poverty

Located on the low northern coastal plain of Java, Semarang is inhabited by 1.4 million people (1998), making it Indonesia's fifth most populous city. The population is expected to reach nearly 1.7 million in 2008. Besides the rapid growth of its population, in the last three decades Semarang has also experienced constant economic growth. However, this often has been at the expense of the existing ecosystems and community systems.

Indiscriminate development of housing estates on the hills surrounding the city, for example, has resulted in serious monsoon flooding in low-lying areas. Excessive coastal land reclamation has caused tidewater inundation in areas near the coast, including the historic old town. Overexploitation of the groundwater for industrial, commercial and residential purposes has caused acute land subsidence in many parts of the city as well as seawater intrusion reaching up to several kilometres inland.

The benefits of Semarang's economic development have not been equitably distributed either. The unprecedented economic growth has created a small privileged group of &new rich', while the gap between poor and rich has widened. Even worse, government interventions, supposedly to alleviate poverty, have often undermined existing traditional social networks, the very ties which, in the current economic crisis, proved to be crucial elements of the coping strategy of the poor (Jellinek and Rustanto, 1999). According to official figures 3% of Semarang's population lives in absolute poverty. Unofficial sources give somewhat higher figures. Some have calculated that around 10% of the population are living in absolute poverty, with an additional 15% being `near poor’. Thus, the total percentage of those living in poverty may have been as high as 25%, and this was before the economic crisis. The crisis has added a substantial number of `new poor’ to the already large number of urban poor. One source has calculated that about 50 - 60% of the population is now poor.

3. The Semarang environmental agenda

Officially, the initiator of Semarang's environmental agenda is the local Environmental Impact Management Agency (better known by its Indonesian acronym: Bapedalda), but in reality it was the World Bank through the Metropolitan Environmental Improvement Project (MEIP) that first suggested the idea. MEIP had been trying to sell the idea of preparing a sustainable development action plan for Semarang to different local government agencies but the only one showing any interest was Bapedalda.

The Bank suggested that Bapedalda work together with a local university to form a Joint Team. The Centre for Urban Studies*Soegijapranata Catholic University, which already had had some experiences working with Bapedalda, was subsequently selected. The task of the joint Bapedalda-Soegijapranata team would be mainly to set up the process of stakeholder involvement.

Bapedalda was rather apprehensive about using the title `Semarang Local Agenda 21a. It feared that other local government agencies might think that Bapedalda was trying to meddle in their a!airs. It was decided that the title `Semarang Environmental Agendaa would generate fewer objections, as the word `environmentala would justify Bapedalda taking the lead.[1]

Referring to the Agenda 21 Indonesia, the Semarang Development Guideline, and the Semarang Five-year Development Plan, the Joint Team prepared a rough, tentative list of environmental issues in Semarang. This draft &Environmental Agenda' was distributed to organisations and institutions seen to represent the various stakeholders. It should be noted that they were more or less arbitrarily selected.[2]

All relevant local government agencies were selected to participate, and so were the universities in Semarang, the business community and various non-governmental organisations. The business community consists of the Chamber of Commerce, the local chapter of the Real Estate Indonesia (the association of Indonesian real estate developers) and two major manufacturing companies.

Non-governmental organisations were selected on the basis of their "eld of activities,[3] which, in practice meant all those being involved in environmental issues and related fields. Various youth, student, women and professional groups (including the Semarang Legal Aid Foundation, the Consumers Group and the Journalist Association) were included in this category. The involvement of community-based organisations was restricted to those having `city widea activities.[4] Those that covered only limited areas, such as neighbourhood associations (rukun tetangga)[5], were not included, as their sheer number made it impractical to do so. In total, 66 organisations, 22 of which were local government agencies and the rest representing the business community and civil society, were invited to take part in the process to develop the Semarang Environmental Agenda.

All stakeholders were then requested to present their reactions to the draft ‘Environmental Agenda'. The Joint Team felt that it would be better to organise two separate meetings to do this.

The first one was for local government agencies, the second for the private sector and the community. The reason for this was that it would allow the local government agencies to first agree among themselves (or to use a favourite expression among Indonesian bureaucrats: `to arrive at a common perceptions’) before meeting the other actors. Non-governmental stakeholder representatives were invited for the second meeting.

It is interesting to note the distinctly different tones of the two meetings. The firrst meeting mainly focused on issues like establishing tasks and responsibilities: which agency is or should be responsible for a certain affair. Also, statistical figures such as the number of poor people, the volume of uncollected garbage, the extent of flooding, etc. were commented upon and discussed at great length. Each agency had its own, sometimes conflicting, figures.

Participants of the second meeting, while expressing their appreciation for being invited to participate,[6] were not interested in such details. Their main concern was with the implementation of the agenda once it was formulated. They strongly questioned the local government's commitment because all too often they had witnessed the government breaking its own promises. The two meetings made it clear that in Semarang at that time, (i) there was no real trust yet between the stakeholders, (ii) the role of the local government was very dominant, and that (iii) the concept of sustainable development was not as yet widely understood.

The Joint Team integrated the inputs gained from these two meetings into a report. The plan was to have more meetings with the two groups of stakeholders followed by a joint plenary discussion.

At the end of this process a stakeholder dialogue forum was to be set up. In the mean time, the MEIP was consulted and asked to comment on the draft report. The MEIP felt that the report was too formal and too academic, and, consequently, not very interesting. The agency was of the opinion that it would not serve the purpose of raising the awareness of and stimulating continued dialogue between the stakeholders. Bapedalda's head, on the other hand, wanted to have something tangible to show to the mayor, a document of some kind, and not just a report on a vague conceptual process. She was rather impatient with the series of meetings and consultations, and suggested that the consultation sessions be skipped except for the plenary session. As a compromise, it was finally agreed that separate consultations with the stakeholders would be organized after the plenary session.

4. The local government of Semarang and its partners

Local governments in Indonesia, following current trends, are trying to move from the role of `providers to that of `enablers. Semarang is no exception as its local government is now expected to create an enabling environment for other actors. As enablers, the local government should facilitate the efforts of and to build on the potentials of other actors by `setting up and jointly managing partnerships, but without having overall controls (Bailey, Barber & MacDonald, 1995).

According to Holmes and Krishna (1996): “By engaging a wide range of stakeholders, the pool of resources available to support decision-making is enlarged, ownership is generated, capacity and learning are enhanced and the quality of performance is enhanced.”

To be able to act as an enabler, local governments according to Yap and Mohit (1998) should at least be able to:

  • Understand and assess the existing conditions;
  • Identify the urban actors locally involved and to understand their interests and motives;
  • Develop policies in consultation with all stakeholders;
  • Identify partners and determine what each partner can do;
  • Negotiate and mediate partnerships to address the problems, and
  • Monitor the process and evaluate the impact.

If these yardsticks are applied to the preparation of the Semarang Environmental Agenda, Semarang has not fared very well.

To understand and assess the existing conditions, for example, accurate, up to date information is needed. But in Semarang there was a serious scarcity of reliable data and information. It is true that most of the needed information was ultimately collected, but it proved very cumbersome to gather it from different sources. Besides, its accuracy was often questionable. Data on the same subject but coming from different sources often gave different, and sometimes even contradicting figures.

Above all, it was found that forging partnerships with other stakeholders was definitely not one of the strong points of Semarang's local government. From the beginning, it had difficulties to identify its partners, to understand their motives and interests, not to mention to determine what each partner can do and to jointly develop relevant policies. Instead of trying to adopt a participatory attitude necessary to establishing partnerships, local government staff often assumed a paternalistic attitude towards other urban actors. Apart from that, a supportive legal, institutional and financial framework was clearly missing.

Mutual trust amongst the parties involved is the most essential foundation for partnerships. Before any real dialogue can take place the parties will have to be able to overcome feelings of suspicion and to treat each other as equals. During the preparation of the Agenda, however, this element of trust, understanding and respect among the stakeholders was conspicuously missing.

To support efforts to build trust and to engage the participation of the stakeholders, there should be a flow of information. In this respect the role of the local government in preparing information and to disseminate this to the widest possible audience is very important. This information should be interesting, imaginative and easy to understand. But as was mentioned earlier, initially there was criticism on the way the first draft of the Agenda was presented. It was just like any other official document: formal, dull and often obscure, not exactly something that the public would easily understand.

For the general public it was also difficult to convey their views to the government as there was no e!ective forum for this purpose. Of course the government of Indonesia has always encouraged its citizens to `participate’ in development. This, however, is interpreted as the people participating in programmes initiated by government in a top-down way. The people are expected to at least give their consent; and, even better, to donate their time, labour and money. Seldom, if ever, are they invited to share their ideas and knowledge. This so-called `participation’ is not based on the concept of co-operation, of partnership, but rather on the concept of mobilisation of people's resources.

This top-down approach has been practised in all aspects of life in Indonesia. Because of the government's very powerful position, civil society is usually left out of the planning and decision making process of development programmes.

This is also true for the Integrated Urban Infrastructure Development Programme (IUIDP), which has been hailed as an innovative urban management approach in Indonesia. One of the reasons for this claim is that the programme has changed the government's approach in urban infrastructure planning and programming from a sectoral and top}down one to a more integrated bottom-up approach. However, the term `bottom-up’ here is misleading as it does not mean real involvement and participation of ordinary citizens at the grass-roots; it only means more local government administrative responsibilities (vis-à-vis the central and provincial governments). The preparation of the Medium-term Investment Plan,[7] the main planning tool of IUIDP, hardly involves the community. This plan is prepared by local governments, and is appraised by provincial and central government agencies.[8]

In view of the key role of the local government in the process of drafting the Environmental Agenda, considerable attention has been given to its role. However, this does not mean that the roles of other urban actors in Semarang are not worth discussing. First, let us briefly consider the private sector. One thing to note here is that some private sector enterprises can afford to be less efficient and cost-effective as they are involved in informal deals, make use of informal contacts and engaged in corrupt practices. Corruption is widespread in Indonesia, and companies try to build rent-seeking `partnerships’ with influential and well-connected elements of the local government.

This misinterpretation of the meaning of partnership has caused distortions in Semarang's development as environmental, social and legal costs are often externalised causing the worsening of environmental degradation and social disparity in the city.

The weakest group of stakeholders in Semarang are those loosely grouped under the heading civil society. Their weak bargaining position has not helped them in negotiations with other stakeholders. Their position is further negatively affected by the fact that there is no real democratic representation. Members of the handpicked city council do not have real constituents and are only accountable to their respective parties (which in reality are only government sponsored ersatz parties). Meanwhile, there is no channel for the rukun tetanggas or neighbourhood associations to be involved in decision making processes at the city level; besides, their interests tend to be limited to neighbourhood wide issues.[9]

The new laws on local autonomy and revenue sharing will enable local authorities to draw up their own pay scales, instead of following the uniform one now effective nation wide. Some natural-resource-rich regions are already trying to attract professionals in central government organisations with offers of attractive salaries.

5. The present and future needs for capacity building in the context of the Semarang environmental agenda

The preparation of the Semarang Environmental Agenda has brought out several weak points as regards the roles, attitudes and modes of operation of all stakeholders involved in the process, but particularly on the part of the key player: the local government. A distinction can be made in this respect between more intangible issues such as a lack of trust and credibility on the one hand, and a more concrete lack of capacities and skills which are required to successfully bring a participatory planning process to a good end. However, it is argued that these issues are linked in many ways: a bureaucracy will only be credible and be trusted as a partner if it is characterised by integrity as well as capability.

Let us first consider the issue of trust and credibility. It was shown that there was a lack of trust among the stakeholders, stemming from the local government's low credibility. One sign of this was sharp rivalry among local government agencies, clearly demonstrated during the preparation of the Semarang Agenda. Government credibility is also undermined by the lack of creativity and the tendency of bureaucrats to avoid responsibility by passing on decision making to higher levels in the hierarchy. Given the lack of confidence in the government on the one hand, and the pivotal role it plays on the other hand, the main priority for capacity building relates to rebuilding the credibility of the local governments. Attention should be given to the creation of a strong organisational culture, good management practices, and effective communication networks, in addition to improving rules and regulations or procedures and pay scales, as Peltenburg, Davidson, Teerlink and Wakely (1996) point out. Of course, it would be too much to expect that the building of a strong organisational culture and shared norms and values would eliminate rivalry altogether, but it can help (various agencies of) local government to develop a common vision based on which it can perform a common mission.

Building up the credibility of the local government would also require improving the quality of its employees. It is widely acknowledged that the number of civil servants in Indonesia, which includes local government personnel, is too large. The government had previously adopted a `zero-growtha policy, and later even a `minus-growtha policy for its civil servants, and has stopped recruiting new personnel. It has not yet gone as far as to lay o! redundant staff, but retired personnel are replaced only in very special cases.

A leaner (and more efficient) workforce would make higher salaries possible. The very low pay of civil servants is often used as an excuse for the rampant corruption in Indonesia, giving it the dubious reputation as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Higher salaries will attract better qualified person to work in local government agencies.[10] Meanwhile, for the remaining staff, there is a need for re-training to improve their quality. From the perspective of staff members, another attraction would be a merit-based career prospective; this should replace present payment and promotion practices based on seniority or on personal connections. These measures to enhance the quality of staff will be important in the future when new people can be again appointed.

In sum, what is urgently needed now is a strategy to develop the capacity of the local government in all three dimensions: human resource development, organisational development and developing and adjusting the institutional and legal framework of local governments. This will enhance local government capacity in general, and the capacity to stimulate and facilitate stakeholders' participation in specific. It will also help local governments to change their attitudes. To paraphrase John F. C. Turner, their attitude should be a willingness to work with the people, instead of for the people, and certainly not for their own vested interests. New skills such as information and communication skills, including the use of modern media like the Internet, will be useful in building awareness and stimulating further participation of stakeholders. To support this it is necessary is to establish an accurate database on the various aspects of urban development, easily accessible to all relevant parties.

But it is not only local governments where more capacity and changed attitudes are required. The private sector needs to understand the importance of being able to compete fairly and openly. The patronage of government officials should not be relied upon anymore. Private companies will have to be able to compete not just with local, but also (in this era of globalisation) with international and multinational competitors.

And finally, turning to civil society, it is imperative that support is given to strengthen its bargaining position. This can be done by giving support to (i) help raise awareness and confidence amongst NGOs and local level and community organisations (ii) show what opportunities are available and (iii) build a network of similar, likeminded organisations which can speak with one voice. Local government can certainly play a role here in terms of providing relevant information and technical and management assistance. But for the time being it may be more realistic to rely on organisations such as the Legal Aid Foundation, the Consumers Group, and other advocacy groups, non-governmental organisations and universities. Capacity building for the people, however, should not be merely focused on their perceived weakness but should also, or perhaps in the first place, address the need to reinforce their existing strength (Aede, 1997).

To summarise, there are clear and urgent capacity building requirements relating both to the local government, the private sector and civil society. The question is whether and how the authorities will respond to these requirements. Before considering the prospects for this, recent political developments in Indonesia are briefly reviewed; developments which have a direct bearing also on the issue of local administrative and political change.

6. A changing context: political change in Indonesia

The preparation of the Semarang Environmental Agenda coincided with a period of fundamental changes in Indonesia. The preparation process started in early 1997; the full impact of the Asian economic crisis had yet to hit Indonesia. President Suharto, who had been in power for three decades, was still in full control of the country. By the end of 1997 Indonesia's economy was in ruins and the value of its currency, the rupiah, fell to a record low. In May 1998 Suharto was forced to resign and in June 1999 a fair and free election was conducted for the first time since 1955.

These changes offer vast opportunities, but the challenges are also overwhelming. The multidimensional crisis has forced the Indonesian people to look back and do some soul searching to try to find out what had gone wrong. Many ideas have been thrown around to solve Indonesia's woes. They have touched on issues that used to be taboo, such as amending the constitution, restricting the role of the military and having a federal instead of a unitary state. There is no doubt that these changes will affect the way Indonesian cities, including Semarang, are managed. For example, as a result of the elections, the city of Semarang, like other local entities in Indonesia, will have a democratically elected city council and mayor. Being more legitimate, they will theoretically be more credible. The introduction of new laws that give local governments extensive political responsibility and fiscal authority[11] will make them even stronger.

The citizens, however, have also become more outspoken in their demand for a local government that can deliver services, deliver them equitably, quickly and inexpensively, and without the people having to pay bribes. The cry for `reformasi’ (reforms), following the severe economic crisis and the even more serious political and social crises, have made the people more aware of their rights. Like people elsewhere in Indonesia, people in Semarang want much more say in a!airs influencing their life. And as part of the political reform, the people have been demanding for a more transparent, responsive and accountable government at all levels.

Despite all that, however, the management of the city will continue to depend on the old bureaucracy for some time to come; a bureaucracy that, besides showing little ability to develop partnerships with other urban actors, is also notoriously corrupt. The local government, its agencies and its staff are ill prepared to deal with the challenges posed by new situation. Though there have been some half-hearted attempts at reforms, the bureaucracy basically still clings to its old ineficient, heavy-handed ways. Its attitude of `business as usual’, acting as if oblivious to the fact that Indonesia is facing a terrible crisis, arguably the worst in its history, has been widely criticised.

This has been the reason why the civil society continues to distrust the local government. Even international donor agencies - though not saying it openly - seem to share this view. The implementation of social safety net programmes for people hardest hit by the crisis brought this out very clearly. The donors practically by-passed local government agencies and went directly to non-governmental and community based organisations instead.

Therefore, with reformasi there is an even more pressing need for the local government to change, if it is to regain its credibility. The process of preparing the Environmental Agenda showed, however, that it is not very likely that the local government will change from within under its own initiative. It needs urging (from powerful bodies such as the World Bank for example); and it also needs critical inputs from partners such as non-governmental organisations, universities and other civil society organisations.

The new city council as a democratically elected legislative body will of course play a central role in controlling the local government. But at the moment there are many people who worry about the quality of the city's new legislators. A majority of them are from newly formed parties. In addition to their lack of experiences, their education level is also generally low. Their counterparts in the local government have much more experience and are better educated. Therefore, without strengthening the capacity of Semarang's City Council, it may not be realistic to expect it to become an e!ective guardian of the people's interests.

7. Conclusion[12]

For the urban stakeholders at the local level in Indonesia to be able to e!ectively respond to the challenges and new opportunities, they will have to develop new attitudes, internalise new knowledge and information and acquire new skills. Hence, there is a clear need for capacity building. But is the supply side ready to meet this demand? Is there enough political will to implement change, to adjust organisations and the institutional context? Are national and local training institutions ready; what can international training institution do; what are the actual options?

In Indonesia, there are some promising developments in the area of human resource development. Many local government staff have realised that there is a need to improve their capacity and have, on their own initiatives, enrolled in various training programmes.[13] There are indications that the national government is starting to realise that there is a need to change the attitude of the bureaucracy. It has, for example introduced changes in the way skills up-grading courses are conducted for civil servants who are to be promoted. In the past, these regional and national level courses tended to be indoctrinative in nature. Indeed, they were deliberately designed to assure loyalty of civil servants to the (old) regime. Quite recently the concept of entrepreneurial government a` la Osborne and Gaebler (1992) has been introduced in these courses, which is undoubtedly related to the change in the political environment. Yet these are only superficial changes which need to be followed up by more fundamental changes. Whether these will take place very much depends on the outcome of still unpredictable political developments.

The current changes in the political situation in Indonesian will hopefully lead to a truly democratic society in which there are partnerships between and mechanisms of `checks and balances' among the urban actors. Otherwise, Semarang and other cities in the country will continue to face the problems similar to those described in this paper, problems which threaten their sustainability: a widening gap between poor and rich and continued environmental degradation.

Solving these problems is constrained by a serious lack of trust amongst the city's stakeholders, a lack of confidence in the local government, widespread corruption and the weak position of civil society organisations in relation to other actors.

The establishment of a credible government will help bring about urgently needed policy changes in the areas of human resource development, organisational development and in institutional and legal frameworks. Only with improved governance is there a chance for more attention for capacity building for improved governance, which can respond to the urgent capacity building requirements identified in this paper. And only then there is hope that Semarang and other Indonesian cities will not have to face far more serious social, economical and ecological problems then they are now already facing.

References

Aede, D. (1997). Capacity Building: An Approach to People-Centred Development. Oxford: Oxfam.

Bailey, N., Barber, A., & MacDonald, K. (1995). Partnership Agencies in British Urban Policy. Toronto: UCL Press.

Holmes, M., & Krishna, A. (1996). Public sector management and participation: institutional support for sustainable development. In: Rietsberger-McCraker, J. (Ed.), Participation in Practice: The Experience of the World Bank and Other Stakeholders World Bank Discussion Paper no. 333. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Jellinek, L., & Rustanto, B. (1999). Survival Strategies of the Javanese during the Economic Crisis. Unpublished Preliminary Report.

Osborne, D., & Gaebler, T. (1992). Reinventing Government. Reading: Addison-Wesley, MA.

Peltenburg, M., Davidson, F., Teerlink, H., & Wakely, P. (1996). Building Capacity for Better Cities. Rotterdam: IHS.

Yap, K. S., & Mohit, R. S. (1998). Reinventing Local Government for Sustainable Cities in Asia: Implementing the Habitat II agenda in education and training. Regional Development Dialogue, 19(1), 87}94.

Further reading

Anonymous (1979). Semarang: Masa Lalu, Masa Sekarang dan Masa Mendatang. Pemerintah Kotamadya Daerah Tingkat II Semarang, Semarang.

Anonymous (1997). Agenda 21 Indonesia*Strategi Nasional untuk Pembangunan Berkelanjutan. Kantor Menteri Negara Lingkungan Hidup, Jakarta.

Anonymous (1998). Agenda Lingkungan Semarang: Menuju kota yang berkelanjutan 1998}2003. Pemerintah Kotamadya Daerah Tingkat II Semarang dan Lembaga Penelitian Universitas Katolik Soegijapranata, Semarang.

International Council for Local Environmental Initiative (1996). The Local Agenda 21 Planning Guide: An Introduction to Sustainable Development Planning. ICLEI, IDRC, UNEP, Toronto.

Jellinek, L. (1991). The Wheels of Fortune. Sydney: Allen and Unwin,

Lanti, A., & van der Hoff, R. (1997). 'The Integrated Urban Infrastructure Development Programme (IUIDP) in Indonesia'. In K. Singh, et al., Integrated Urban Infrastructure Development in Asia. New Delhi and Oxford: IBH Publishing.

Project INS/90/026 Formulation of Provincial Shelter Strategies to Strengthen the National Shelter Strategy of Indonesia (1993). Recommended Provincial Shelter Strategies for Central Java. UNDP and the Ministry of Housing, Jakarta.



[1] The Badan Pengendali Dampak Lingkungan Daerah (Bapedalda) is a local government agency responsible for environmental related issues. Its head reports directly to the mayor. However, within the local government there is also an environmental division (Bagian Lingkungan Hidup) whose responsibilities often overlap Bapedalda's.

[2] The local government played a dominant role in the selection of stakeholder representatives. For instance, only those non-governmental organisations not too critical to the government were invited. The three government-sanctioned parties were not invited, as they had no real political influence and were set up merely as proof that Indonesia was a democracy.

[3] At first Bapedalda was not comfortable with the idea of involving non-government institutions in the preparation of the Agenda, but eventually it was convinced of the potential benefits of this approach.

[4] Only one CBO actually fulfilled this criterion. In Semarang there is no real city-wide community-based organisation. What was here considered as such was an association of community-based housing groups that actually only represented a small number of people scattered all over the city.

[5] The rukun tetangga is found in every community in Indonesia. Its voluntary leadership is elected directly by heads of households in the particular neighbourhood, making it one of the more democratic institutions in Indonesia under the New Order regime. It is, though, still male biased, as heads of households tend to be male. It was originally set up by the Japanese occupation government during World War II to mobilise and control the populace; it was revived in 1969 to stimulate community development. Each RT consists of about 30 households.

[6] A number of them acknowledged that this was the first time they were invited to take part in a discussion on policy issues by the local government. Originally, it was feared that the Bapedalda would suggest that the government controlled local legislative body represent the stakeholders.

[7] Program Jangka Menengah (PJM) in Indonesian

[8] In practice, as they lack the required capacity, local governments appoint consultants to do the job. This often gives

[9] The new law on local government has tried to address this issue by stipulating that at the village (rural and urban) level there will be a directly elected legislative body. In the old system the lowest legislative body is at the city level that was in reality a mere rubber stamp body.

[10] The new laws on local autonomy and revenue sharing will enable local authorities to draw up their own pay scales, instead of following the uniform one now e!ective nation wide. Some natural-resource-rich regions are already trying to attract professionals in central government organisations with o!ers of attractive salaries.

[11] Two new national laws have recently been passed. Thefirst one will give wider decision making power to the local government, while at the same time making them more accountable to their constituents. The local legislative body, which in the past was considered part of the local government, is now seen as a separate entity. The second law will give local governments considerably more revenue sharing power.

[12] I am indebted to Cor Dijkgraaf of IHS for the insights he gave me for this section. However, the views expressed are entirely my own

[13] There have been many cases, however, when these people become disappointed after returning to their regular working environment. The high hopes they had to be able to do something worthwhile with their newly acquired knowledge are often not in line with the rigid bureaucratic system.

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